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Abstract
A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be
necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of corre-
spondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonic-
ity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key
condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for
rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is
that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly
different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation,
when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational ex-
pectations significantly expands the class of rules that can be decentralized
by communication-based economic institutions.
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: Complete information, implementation, Maskin monotonicity,
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1 Introduction
The design of institutions to be used by rational agents has been an important
research agenda in economic theory. As captured by the notion of Nash equilib-
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rium, rationality is encapsulated in two aspects: these are (i) the best responses of
agents to their beliefs, and (ii) that those beliefs are correct, the so-called rational
expectations assumption. One can drop the latter and retain the former, moving
then into the realm of rationalizability. One would conjecture that the design of
institutions under rationalizable behavior, i.e., without insisting on rational expec-
tations, should leave room for significantly different results than the theory based
on equilibrium.1 Settling this important question is our task in this paper. We
show that dropping rational expectations significantly expands the class of rules
that can be decentralized by communication-based institutions designed by the
Central Authority for participating agents in the system.
The theory of Nash implementation has uncovered the conditions under which
one can design a mechanism (or game form) such that the set of its Nash equi-
librium outcomes coincides with a given social choice correspondence (henceforth,
SCC). Indeed, Maskin (1999) proposes a well-known monotonicity condition, which
we refer to as Maskin monotonicity. Maskin’s (1999) main result shows that Maskin
monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for Nash implementation.
Nash implementation is concerned with complete information environments, in
which all agents know the underlying state and this fact is commonly certain among
them. As a foundation of Nash equilibrium, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)
delineate a set of epistemic conditions under which the agents’ strategic interac-
tion always leads to a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Polak (1999) shows that
when the agents’ payoffs are commonly certain, as complete information environ-
ments prescribe, the Aumann-Brandenburger epistemic conditions imply common
certainty of rationality.
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) independently propose rationalizability, a
weaker solution concept than Nash equilibrium, by asking what are the strategic
implications that come solely from common certainty of rationality. Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987) allow for the agents’ beliefs to be correlated and propose an
even weaker version of rationalizability. Lipman (1994) extends the concept of
rationalizability to games with infinite action sets. In this case, the set of all
rationalizable strategies is fully characterized in terms of the strategies that survive
the (possibly transfinite) iterative deletion of never best responses, taking limits
as needed. Throughout the current paper, our discussion is entirely based upon
Lipman’s (1994) extension of correlated rationalizability of Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987).
In a paper that was our starting point and motivation, Bergemann, Morris, and
Tercieux (2011) –BMT in the sequel– recently consider the implementation of social
1On the one hand, from the existence point of view, since rationalizability is a weaker solution
concept, one would conjecture a more permissive theory. On the other hand, uniqueness would
be harder to establish. Hence, the answer, a priori, is far from clear.
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choice functions (henceforth, SCFs) under complete information in rationalizable
strategies. By an SCF we mean a single-valued SCC. They show that Maskin
monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation.
This essentially would imply that rationalizable implementation is similar to Nash
implementation. However, their result has one important caveat: BMT focus only
on SCFs in their analysis (we note that rationalizability and single-valuedness
amount to uniqueness of Nash equilibrium). In any attempt to extend their result,
one should ponder the following observations: (1) Maskin’s characterization on
Nash implementation holds true regardless of whether we consider SCFs or SCCs;
(2) Maskin monotonicity can be quite restrictive in the case of SCFs (see, e.g.,
Mueller and Satterthwaite (1977) and Saijo (1987)); and (3) Many interesting
SCCs are Maskin monotonic, including the Pareto, Core, envy-free, constrained
Walrasian or Lindhal correspondences, while any SCF selected from a Maskin
monotonic SCC no longer inherits the property.2
Therefore, what we set out to resolve here is the question of how close ra-
tionalizable implementation really is to Nash implementation, without imposing
the straightjacket of single-valuedness. We interpret characterizations of imple-
mentable correspondences as descriptions of all that is feasible for the mechanism
designer, and in this sense, multi-valuedness strikes us as being quite plausible. In
dealing with correspondences, we identify a new condition, which we call uniform
monotonicity, basically closing the gap between necessity and sufficiency.3 We
show that uniform monotonicity is necessary (Theorem 1) and almost sufficient
(Theorem 2) for rationalizable implementation of SCCs.4 Our uniform monotonic-
ity requires the lower contour sets to be nested across states “uniformly” over all
outcomes in the range of the SCC. This setwise definition of monotonicity exhibits
a clear contrast with Maskin monotonicity, which is a “pointwise” condition, in the
sense that it requires the nestedness of the lower contour sets across states at any
fixed outcome in the range of the SCC (see Subsection 4.1). Uniform monotonicity
is logically weaker than Maskin monotonicity, and it is likely to be much weaker if
the SCC contains many values in its range. However, both become equivalent in
the case of SCFs. We also construct an example in which an SCC is rationalizably
implementable by a finite mechanism, while it violates Maskin monotonicity at al-
most any outcome in the range of the SCC. In this sense, the SCC in the example
2The results in BMT (2011) contrasts with the much more permissive findings in Abreu and
Matsushima (1994) for implementation in iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies,
or those in Abreu and Matsushima (1992), even though the latter are obtained for virtual or
approximate implementation.
3A weaker version of this condition, based on the strict lower contour sets, first surfaced in
Cabrales and Serrano (2011) under the name weak quasimonotonicity; see also its corrigendum,
posted at http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/pdfs/2011GEB73-corrigendum.pdf.
4Theorem 2 assumes at least three agents and a “strong no worst alternative” condition.
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is “very far from” being Nash implementable. Of course, as expected from our
necessity result, we confirm that uniform monotonicity is satisfied for this SCC
(Lemma 1).
Thus, rationalizable implementation is generally quite different from Nash im-
plementation, and their alleged resemblance in BMT arose as an artifact of the
assumption that only SCFs were being considered. This allows us to conclude
that the design of economic institutions that rely on agents as best-responders,
but which drop the rational expectations assumption, is possible for a significantly
wider class of socially desirable rules. In drawing that landscape of possibilities,
we have relied on a novel canonical mechanism that heavily exhibits the violation
of rational expectations. In particular, we do not require the existence of Nash
equilibrium in the mechanism, unlike BMT.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
general notation for the paper. Section 3 introduces rationalizability as our solution
concept and defines the concept of rationalizable implementation. In Section 4,
we propose and discuss uniform monotonicity, and show it to be necessary for
rationalizable implementation. Section 5 illustrates by an example the conditions
for rationalizable implementation and Nash implementation. In Section 6, we
propose sufficient conditions for full implementation in rationalizable strategies,
and provide a sketch of the proof to highlight the intuition behind our mechanism.
Section 7 concludes. In the Appendix, we provide the proof of a claim (omitted
from the main body of the paper), discuss the ordinal approach to rationalizable
implementation as well as the role of finite mechanisms, and extend our results to
the case of weak implementation.
2 Preliminaries
LetN = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of agents and Θ be the finite set of states. It
is assumed that the underlying state θ ∈ Θ is common knowledge among the agents.
Let A denote the set of social alternatives, which are assumed to be independent
of the information state. We shall assume that A is countable, and denote by
∆(A) the set of probability distributions over A.5 Agent i’s state dependent von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : ∆(A) × Θ → R. We can
now define an environment as E = (A,Θ, (ui)i∈N), which is implicitly understood
to be common knowledge among the agents.
A (stochastic) social choice correspondence F : Θ ⇒ ∆(A) is a mapping from
Θ to a nonempty compact subset of ∆(A).6 The mapping F is called a social
5It is easy to see that one can extend our arguments to a separable metric space of alternatives,
focusing on its countable dense subset.
6The compact-valuedness of the SCC is used in our sufficiency results. We note, for instance,
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choice function if it is a single-valued social choice correspondence. In this case,
we denote it by f : Θ → ∆(A). We henceforth use the acronyms SCC and SCF
for both objects, respectively.
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a nonempty countable
message space Mi for each agent i ∈ N and an outcome function g : M → ∆(A)
where M = M1 × · · · ×Mn.
3 Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies
We adopt correlated rationalizability, allowing the agents’ beliefs to be correlated,
as a solution concept and investigate the implications of implementation in ra-
tionalizable strategies. We fix a mechanism Γ = (M, g) and define a message
correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where each Si ∈ 2Mi , and we write S for
the collection of message correspondence profiles. The collection S is a lattice with
the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S ′ if Si ⊆ S
′
i for all i ∈ N . The largest
element is S̄ = (M1, . . . ,Mn). The smallest element is S = (∅, . . . , ∅).
We define an operator bθ : S → S to iteratively eliminate never best responses








∃λi ∈ ∆(M−i) such that
(1)λi(m−i) > 0⇒ mj ∈ Sj ∀j 6= i;







Observe that bθ is increasing by definition: i.e., S ≤ S ′ ⇒ bθ(S) ≤ bθ(S ′). By
Tarski’s fixed point theorem, there is a largest fixed point of bθ, which we label
SΓ(θ). Thus, (i) bθ(SΓ(θ)) = SΓ(θ) and (ii) bθ(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ(θ). We can also
construct the fixed point SΓ(θ) by starting with S̄ – the largest element of the













In this case, the solution coincides with iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. But because the mechanism Γ may be infinite, transfinite induction












that it is consistent with the environment in Mezzetti and Renou (2012), who consider Nash
implementation in terms of the support of the equilibrium, with finite A and deterministic SCCs.
Although in their footnote 4 (p. 2360), they argue that their results extend to the case in which
A is a separable metric space and the SCC maps Θ into a countable dense subset of A, this is
possible because they only insist on its implementation in terms of the “support” of the Nash
equilibrium outcomes.
5
using transfinite induction if necessary. Thus, S
Γ(θ)
i is the set of messages surviving
(transfinite) iterated deletion of never best responses of agent i. We refer the reader
to Lipman (1994) for the formal treatment.
This is the central definition of implementability that we use in this paper:
Definition 1 (Full Rationalizable Implementation) An SCC F is fully im-
plementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ =
(M, g) such that for each θ ∈ Θ,⋃
m∈SΓ(θ)
{g(m)} = F (θ).
Remark: This is the definition of implementability that Maskin (1999) adopts for
Nash implementation. We believe that this is the right paradigm if we want to
compare the permissiveness of Nash implementation theory versus a theory based
on rationalizability. However, we also consider a weaker notion of implementation:
an SCC F is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a
mechanism Γ = (M, g) such that for each θ ∈ Θ, we have (i) SΓ(θ) 6= ∅ and (ii)
g(m) ∈ F (θ) for each m ∈ SΓ(θ). The reader is referred to Section A.4 for the
details of the analysis in this case.
4 Uniform Monotonicity
In this section, we introduce a central condition to our results, which we term
uniform monotonicity. We motivate it by comparing it to Maskin monotonicity,
and we later show that uniform monotonicity is necessary for rationalizable imple-
mentation.
For the domain of complete information environments, Maskin (1999) proposes
a monotonicity condition for Nash implementation where the set of Nash equilib-
rium outcomes is required to coincide with the SCC. This condition is often called
Maskin monotonicity.
Definition 2 An SCC F satisfies Maskin monotonicity if, for any states θ, θ
′ ∈
Θ and any a ∈ F (θ), if
ui(a, θ) ≥ ui(z, θ)⇒ ui(a, θ
′
) ≥ ui(z, θ
′
) ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A),
then a ∈ F (θ′).
Let D denote a countable subset of ∆(A) with a generic element d being a










Definition 3 An SCC F satisfies weak uniform monotonicity if, for every
pair of states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, if
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ co(F (θ)), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A),
then, F (θ) ⊆ F (θ′).
Remark: When we consider SCFs, co(F (θ)) becomes a singleton set. Therefore,
in this case, the condition just defined reduces to Maskin monotonicity.
We slightly strengthen weak uniform monotonicity into the following:
Definition 4 An SCC F satisfies uniform monotonicity if, for every pair of
states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, if
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ F (θ), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A),
then F (θ) ⊆ F (θ′).
Remark: Note how, under expected utility, both conditions amount to the same
thing, as requiring the nestedness of the lower contour sets over all a ∈ F (θ) or
their convex hull is equivalent. However, it will be convenient to use the weak
version for the proof of the necessity result, and the strong version for the proof of
sufficiency.
4.1 Intuition and Examples
The comparison between Maskin monotonicity and uniform monotonicity is in-
structive. Maskin monotonicity always implies uniform monotonicity. The former
checks for the “pointwise” inclusion, at an alternative a ∈ F (θ), of the lower con-
tour sets of agents’ preferences in state θ into those in θ
′
, in order to determine
whether that same alternative a should still remain in F (θ
′
). The latter takes the
entire set of alternatives F (θ) and checks “uniformly” whether, for each agent and
a ∈ F (θ), his lower contour set at a in θ is contained in the lower contour set of
a at θ
′
, in order to determine that all outcomes in F (θ) should still be in F (θ
′
).
In other words, for an outcome a ∈ F (θ) to fall out of the SCC at θ′ a preference
reversal involving outcome a and another outcome b ∈ ∆(A) is required if the
SCC is Maskin monotonic. If the SCC is uniformly monotonic, for a ∈ F (θ) and
a /∈ F (θ′) to happen, all that is required is a preference reversal involving some
pair x ∈ F (θ) and y ∈ ∆(A) and, importantly, x need not be the same as a. In
this sense, uniform monotonicity is likely to be extremely weak in many settings
because such “uniform inclusions” of lower contour sets will just be impossible,

















Figure 1: The Permissiveness of Uniform Monotonicity
exchange economy (before extending it to expected utility preferences), if an SCC
contains outcomes in which each agent is assigned bundles on different indifference
curves (say ai and bi), it will generally be very difficult that the indifference curve
through ai at θ be nested into the one through the same bundle at θ
′
, and at the
same time, that the same nestedness happens for the indifference curves through
bundle bi. The reader is referred to Figure 1 for an illustration of this difficulty.
In the figure, one can see that the nestedness of the lower contour sets at ai from
θ to θ
′




The same logic applies if one uses the probability simplex of lotteries over al-
ternatives. With expected utility, the indifference map under any state consists of
parallel straight lines. Maskin monotonicity is a trivial condition at points in the
interior of the simplex, as the lower contour sets at any point are never nested (this
was the key insight behind the very permissive results of virtual implementation
(Abreu and Sen (1991), Matsushima (1988)), for instance). Thus, to make the ar-
gument of the relative permissiveness of uniform monotonicity, one should consider
SCC’s whose outcomes are at the boundaries of the simplex. Again, it will not be
generally easy to have that all the lower contour sets at multiple boundary points




This is not to say that uniform monotonicity is universally satisfied by all SCCs.
Indeed, some SCCs may violate it. For instance, consider the egalitarian-equivalent
allocation correspondence (henceforth, the EEA rule) in an exchange economy with
continuous, convex, and strictly monotone preferences (define feasible allocations
with equality between total consumption and aggregate endowment).7 Pazner and
Schmeidler (1978) originally propose such an allocation rule and characterize it as
the subset of feasible allocations for each of which there is a “reference” bundle on
the ray that goes from the origin to the aggregate endowment vector such that each
agent is indifferent between his assigned bundle and the reference bundle. Given
the assumptions we imposed on the economy, the EEA rule is always nonempty,
as the equal-division rule is egalitarian-equivalent. First we confirm that the EEA
rule violates Maskin monotonicity. Let aθ be an allocation specified by the EEA
rule in state θ. Even if the nestedness of lower contour sets at aθ across states is
satisfied, as long as an agent’s indifference curves at aθ are not identical between
two states, the original allocation aθ no longer remains egalitarian-equivalent in the
new state. Second, we argue that the EEA rule even violates uniform monotonicity
(recall that uniform monotonicity is logically weaker than Maskin monotonicity).
For the sake of expositional simplicity, consider the case where there are two agents
and two commodities, each with the same aggregate amount. Assume further that
agents have different Cobb-Douglas utility functions so that the contract curve
(i.e., the set of Pareto efficient allocations) always lies either above or below the
diagonal of the Edgeworth box. Then, we know that the equal-division rule is
“not” Pareto efficient but as Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) show, there is a unique
egalitarian equivalent allocation that is Pareto efficient. This implies that the EEA
rule is genuinely a multi-valued correspondence consisting of these two allocations.
Suppose the nestedness of the lower contour sets across states “over both outcomes
in the EEA rule” needed for uniform monotonicity is satisfied. Note that the equal-
division allocation continues to be egalitarian equivalent in the new state trivially.
Let z̄θ be the reference bundle that corresponds to the unique Pareto efficient and
egalitarian-equivalent allocation in state θ. In order for uniform monotonicity to
hold, one must have that, given the reference bundle z̄θ′ , all agents’ indifference
curves through the assigned bundle in the new state θ
′
must continue to intersect
at z̄θ′ . However, this cannot be guaranteed by the monotonic transformation of
preferences we have for the hypothesis of uniform monotonicity. Therefore, the
EEA rule violates uniform monotonicity.8
7An allocation (xi)i∈N is said to be egalitarian-equivalent if there is a bundle z such that z is
indifferent to xi for every i ∈ N .
8Dutta and Vohra (1993) show in their Theorem 2 that the EEA rule satisfies a condition
of weak positive association, denoted by WPAh, which is weaker than Maskin monotonicity.
Clarifying the connection between WPAh and uniform monotonicity might be an interesting
open question, left for future research.
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4.2 Necessity for Rationalizable Implementation
We proceed to state and prove our first result, which identifies a necessary condition
for rationalizable implementation:
Theorem 1 If an SCC F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies, it
satisfies weak uniform monotonicity.
Proof : Suppose F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies by a mech-
anism Γ = (M, g). Fix two states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ satisfying the following property:
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ co(F (θ)), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A) (∗)
Then, due to the hypothesis that F is implementable by Γ, we fix m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ), and
we have that g(m∗) ∈ F (θ).
Fix i ∈ N . Since m∗i ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i , there exists λ
m∗i ,θ
i ∈ ∆(M−i) satisfying the fol-
lowing two properties: (i) λ
m∗i ,θ























We focus on the best response property of m∗i summarized by inequality (ii).
Fix m
′
i ∈Mi. Due to the construction of λ
m∗i ,θ














ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(za; θ),

















Since g(m∗i ,m−i) ∈ F (θ) for each m−i with λ
m∗i ,θ
i (m−i) > 0, we have a ∈
co(F (θ)). Using Property (∗), we also obtain
ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(za; θ
′
).
Due to the choice of a and za and the hypothesis that ui(·) is a von-Neumann-


















Since this argument does not depend upon the choice of m
′
i, this shows that m
∗
i
is a best response to λ
m∗i ,θ
i in state θ
′




i . Since the
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choice of agent i is arbitrary, we can conclude that m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ
′
). Furthermore, since
the choice of m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ) is also arbitrary, we have SΓ(θ) ⊆ SΓ(θ
′
). Finally, by full









{g(m)} = F (θ′).
The proof is thus complete. 
5 An Example
In this section, we show by example that rationalizable implementation can be very
different from Nash implementation. We consider the following example. There
are two agents N = {1, 2}; two states Θ = {α, β}; and a finite number K of pure
outcomes A = {a1, a2 . . . , aK} where K ≥ 4.9 Assume that it is commonly certain
that both agents know the state, i.e., it is a complete information environment.
Agent 1’s utility function is given as follows: for each k = 1, . . . , K,
u1(ak, α) = u1(ak, β) =
{
1 +Kε if k = K,
1 + (K − k)ε if k 6= K,
where ε ∈ (0, 1). Hence, agent 1 has state-uniform preferences over A and aK is
the best outcome in both states; a1 is the second best outcome in both states; ...;
and aK−1 is the worst outcome in both states for agent 1.
Agent 2’s utility function in state α is defined as follows: for each k = 1, . . . , K,
u2(ak, α) =

1 + (K + 1)ε if k = K,
1 +Kε if k = 2,
1 + kε otherwise.
In state β, agent 2’s utility function is defined as follows: for each k = 1, . . . , K,
u2(ak, β) =

1 + (K + 1)ε if k = K,
1 if k = 2,
1 + kε otherwise.
Note that aK is the best outcome for agent 2 in both states; a2 is his second best
outcome in state α but it is his worst outcome in state β; and aK−1 is his third
best outcome in state α and it is his second best outcome in state β.
We consider the following SCC F : F (α) = {a1, a2, . . . , aK} and F (β) = {aK}.
9This example builds upon the one discussed in the Concluding Remarks section of BMT
(2011).
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Claim 1 For every outcome ak ∈ A with ak 6= a2,
ui(ak, α) ≥ ui(y, α)⇒ ui(ak, β) ≥ ui(y, β) ∀i = {1, 2}, ∀y ∈ ∆(A).
Proof : Since agent 1 has state-uniform preferences, this claim is trivially true
for agent 1. Thus, in what follows, we focus on agent 2. Take any lottery in the
lower contour set of ak ∈ A \ {a2} in state α. If that lottery did not contain a2
in its support, it is still in the lower contour set of ak in state β as no utilities
have changed, and if it did contain a2 in its support, since the utility of a2 has
decreased, it will also be in the lower contour set at β. This completes the proof.

Fix ak ∈ A\{a2, aK} arbitrarily. If F were to satisfy Maskin monotonicity, we
would have ak ∈ F (β), which is not the case. Therefore, we confirm the violation of
Maskin monotonicity by the SCC F at every ak ∈ A\{a2, aK}. As is clear from the
construction, we can choose K arbitrarily large. Therefore, the violation of Maskin
monotonicity is severe, measured by the number of alternatives that should remain
in the social choice in state β given the relevant nestedness of agents’ preferences
across the two states. In this sense, this correspondence is “very far” from being
Maskin monotonic.
Nevertheless, we claim that the SCC F is implementable in rationalizable
strategies using a finite mechanism. Consider the following mechanism Γ = (M, g)
where Mi = {m1i ,m2i , . . . ,mKi } for each i = 1, 2 and the deterministic outcome








2 · · · mK−12 mK2
m11 a1 a1 aK−2 aK−3 · · · a2 aK−1
m21 a2 a1 a1 aK−2 · · · a3 aK−1
m31 a3 a2 a1 a1 · · · a4 aK−1









mK−11 a1 aK−2 aK−3 aK−4 · · · a1 aK−1
mK1 aK−1 aK−1 aK−1 aK−1 · · · aK−1 aK
Claim 2 The SCC F is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies by the
mechanism Γ.
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Proof : In state α, all messages can be best responses. Therefore, no message
can be discarded via the iterative elimination of never best responses. That is,
the set of rationalizable message profiles SΓ(α) = M . This implies that the set of
rationalizable outcomes in state α is F (α) = {a1, a2, . . . , aK}.
In state β, message mK2 strictly dominates all other messages, m
1
2, . . . ,m
K−1
2
for agent 2. On the other hand, all messages for agent 1 can be a best response.
In the second round of elimination of never best responses, mK1 strictly dominates
all other messages m11, . . . ,m
K−1
1 for agent 1. Thus, we have S
Γ(β) = {(mK1 ,mK2 )}.
This implies that we have F (β) = {aK} as the unique rationalizable outcome in
state β. This completes the proof. 
BMT (2011) show in their Proposition 1 that strict Maskin monotonicity is nec-
essary for implementation in rationalizable strategies under complete information.
It follows from the previous example that this crucially relies on the assumption
that only SCFs were considered in BMT’s main result. More specifically, we show
that, while the failure of Maskin monotonicity is severe, implementation in ratio-
nalizable strategies is still possible by a finite mechanism. For completeness, we
provide the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The SCC F satisfies uniform monotonicity.
Proof : Since agent 1 has state-uniform preferences, we only focus on agent
2 in the following argument. First, we set θ = α and θ
′
= β in the definition
of uniform monotonicity. We know that F (α) = {a1, . . . , aK} and by Claim 1,
for any a ∈ F (α)\{a2, aK} and i ∈ {1, 2}, we have the corresponding monotonic
transformation from α to β. For a2 ∈ F (α) and a3 ∈ A, however, we have
u2(a2;α) > u2(a3;α) and u2(a2; β) < u2(a3; β).
Therefore, the condition needed for the monotonic transformation from α to β
under uniform monotonicity is not satisfied. Hence, in this case, uniform mono-
tonicity imposes no conditions on SCCs.
Second, we set θ = β and θ
′
= α in the definition of uniform monotonicity.
Since F (β) = {aK} and aK is the best outcome for agent 2 in both states, we have
that for any y ∈ ∆(A),
u2(aK ; β) ≥ u2(y; β)⇒ u2(aK ;α) ≥ u2(y;α).
In this case, uniform monotonicity implies that aK ∈ F (α), which is indeed the
case. Thus, F satisfies uniform monotonicity. 
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6 Sufficient Conditions for Full Implementation
in Rationalizable Strategies
We turn in this section to our general sufficiency result. Before that, we introduce
an additional condition.
Definition 5 An SCC F satisfies the strong no-worst-alternative condition
(henceforth, SNWA) if, for each θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ N , there exists zθi ∈ ∆(A) such
that, for each a ∈ F (θ),
ui(a; θ) > ui(z
θ
i ; θ).
Remark: This condition is introduced by Cabrales and Serrano (2011). In words,
SNWA says that the SCC never assign the worst outcome to any agent at any state.
BMT (2011) use its SCF-version and call it the no-worst-alternative condition
(NWA).
Lemma 2 If an SCC F satisfies SNWA, then for each i ∈ N , there exists a








) ∀a ∈ F (θ′)
and whenever θ 6= θ′,
ui(zi(θ, θ
′





Proof : This is a straightforward extension of Lemma 2 in BMT (2011) to
SCCs. We omit the proof. 
For the sufficiency result we establish below, we propose the following mech-














• m1i ∈ Θ, i.e., a state;
• m2i = {m2i [θ]}θ∈Θ where m2i [θ] ∈ F (θ), i.e., a state-dependent menu of socially
desirable alternatives, understood as a recommendation to the designer;
• m3i = {(m3i [θ, 1],m3i [θ, 2])}θ∈Θ where m3i [θ, 1] ∈ ∆(A) and m3i [θ, 2] ∈ F (θ),
i.e., a state-dependent pair of alternatives, one of them in the SCC, under-
stood as potential arguments for a challenge to the designer;
• m4i ∈ ∆(A), i.e., a state-independent alternative, also understood as a chal-
lenge to the designer;
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• m5i ∈ N , i.e., a number chosen from {1, . . . , n}, understood as a vote for
some person to be the king;
• and m6i ∈ N, i.e., a positive integer.
The outcome function g : M → ∆(A) is defined as follows: for each m ∈M :
Rule 1. Consensus implements the recommendation made by the elected
king: If there exists θ
′ ∈ Θ such that m1i = θ
′
and m6i = 1 for all i ∈ N , then
g(m) = m2t [θ
′




j) (mod n+ 1).
Rule 2. An odd man out: If there exist θ
′ ∈ Θ and i ∈ N such that [a] m1j = θ
′
and m6j = 1 for all j 6= i, and [b] either m6i > 1 or m1i 6= θ
′
, then the following
subrules apply:
Rule 2-1. A nongreedy odd man out is heard in his challenge, al-











) and m2t [θ
′
] = m3i [θ
′

















) with probability 1/(m6i + 1)
Rule 2-2. A greedy odd man out is not heard in his challenge, and some












) with probability 1/(m6i + 1)




j) (mod n+ 1).
Rule 3. Stronger disagreements lead to the integer game, implementing




























Next, we state the general sufficiency result for full implementation in rational-
izable strategies.
Theorem 2 Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3). If an SCC F sat-
isfies uniform monotonicity and SNWA, it is fully implementable in rationalizable
strategies.
Proof : We use the mechanism Γ = (M, g) constructed above. The proof
consists of Steps 1 through 4. Before going into the details of the proof, we briefly
sketch its basic logic. We discuss the properties of our mechanism after providing
the formal proof.
In Step 1, we show that any rationalizable message mi involves m
6
i = 1, that
is, there must be at least consensus in the integer chosen. If this were not the
case, either Rule 2 (odd man out) or Rule 3 (stronger disagreements) is triggered
with probability one. By choosing the third and fourth components of the message
appropriately, it is strictly better for agent i to announce an integer even higher
than m6i , which contradicts the hypothesis that mi is rationalizable.
In Step 2, we prove that any outcome in the range of the SCC can be supported
by a rationalizable message profile. Let θ be the true state and fix a ∈ F (θ)
arbitrarily. We construct the following message profile m: m1i = θ; m
5
i = 1; and
m6i = 1 for every i ∈ N and m21[θ] = a. Note first that no agent has an incentive
to become the odd man out and induce Rule 2 by unilaterally deviating from m.
Thus, the specification of the third and fourth components of the messages do not
matter. Then, m induces Rule 1 with probability one and g(m) = a where agent 1
is the king, the winner of the modulo game. The novelty of the argument is that
we can make m1 rationalizable because agent 1 believes that agent 2 is a “generous
king” so as to choose agent 1’s best outcome from F (θ). Similarly, we can also
make m2 rationalizable because agent 2 believes that agent 3 is a “generous king”
so as to choose agent 2’s best outcome from F (θ). We extend this argument to all
agents so that we can make m rationalizable.
In Step 3, we show that every agent believes that all rationalizable message
profiles induce Rule 1 (consensus also in the announced state) with probability one.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that agent i believes with positive probability
that Rule 2 (odd man out) or Rule 3 (stronger disagreements) is triggered. By
choosing the third and fourth components of the message appropriately and an
integer in its sixth component sufficiently high, agent i is able to find an even
better response against his belief. This is a contradiction. Step 3 implies that one





, . . .. For instance, in the θ
′
component, this is the announced state by
each agent in the first item of their messages, which also determines the event to
which each of them assigns probability 1. That is, in that component, each agent
16
i believes that all the others are using strategies of the form (θ
′
, ·, ·, ·, ·, 1) with
probability 1.
Finally, in Step 4, we prove that if m is a message profile such that mi =
(θ
′
, ·, ·, ·, ·, 1) ∈ SΓ(θ)i for each i ∈ N , then g(m) ∈ F (θ). If θ
′
= θ, this is trivially
true. So, we assume θ
′ 6= θ. First, using the features of the canonical mechanism,
a technical claim –Claim 3– shows that if one has a rationalizable message profile,
one can modify it slightly in order to support any outcome in the range of the social
choice correspondence. After that claim, the proof is by contradiction. If in state θ
there were a rationalizable message profile whose outcome is not in F (θ), it must be
the case that all agents are coordinating in a deception in which they are reporting
state θ
′
, and given previous steps in the proof, the outcome must be actually in
F (θ
′
). Uniform monotonicity allows us then to use the preference reversal for at
least an agent and at least an alternative a∗ ∈ F (θ′). By the technical claim, this
should also be supported by rationalizable messages, but we show it cannot.
Now, we proceed to the formal proof. Throughout, we denote the true state by
θ
Step 1: mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i ⇒ m6i = 1.












i ) ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i . Suppose by way
of contradiction that m6i > 1. Then, for any profile of messages m−i that agent
i’s opponents may play, (mi,m−i) will trigger either Rule 2 or Rule 3. We can




∣∣ ∃θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. m1j = θ′ ,m2j [θ′ ] ∈ F (θ′), and m6j = 1 ∀j 6= i}
denotes the set of messages of all agents but i in which Rule 2 is triggered, and
M3−i ≡M−i\M2−i
denotes the set of messages of all agents but i in which Rule 3 is triggered.
Suppose first that agent i has a belief λi ∈ ∆(M−i) under which Rule 3 is
triggered with positive probability, so that
∑
m−i∈M3−i
λi(m−i) > 0. If ui(m
4
i ; θ) >
ui(z
θ
i ; θ), we define m̂i as the same as mi except that m̂
6
i is chosen to be larger than
m6i . In doing so, agent i decreases the probability that z is chosen in Rule 3. So,









i ; θ) ≤ ui(zθi ; θ), we define m̂i as the same as mi except that m̂4i ∈ F (θ) and
m̂6i is chosen to be larger than m
6
i . Similarly, conditional on Rule 3, we obtain the
same inequality.




λi(m−i) > 0. We again consider a deviation from
mi to m̂i and observe that the choice of m̂
4
i does not affect the outcome of the
mechanism conditional on Rule 2.
First, assume that m1j = θ
′ 6= θ for each j 6= i. Suppose ui(m3i [θ
′
, 1]; θ) ≥
ui(zi(θ, θ
′
); θ). In this case, agent i could change mi to m̂i by having m̂
6
i larger than





















, 1]; θ) < ui(zi(θ, θ
′
); θ). In this case, agent i




, 1] = zi(θ, θ
′
), m̂6i > m
6
i > 1, and keeping
mi unchanged otherwise. Since ui(zi(θ, θ
′




); θ), we have that,






Second, assume that m1j = θ for each j 6= i. We choose t∗ 6= i and m∗−i ∈
supp(λi(·)) such that for each j 6= i and m−i ∈ supp(λi(·)),
ui(m
∗2
t∗ [θ]; θ) ≥ ui(m2j [θ]; θ).
Then, in this case, agent i could change mi to m̂i by having m̂
3
i [θ, 1] = m
∗2
t∗ [θ]
and m̂6i > m
6
i > 1, keeping mi unchanged otherwise. Since ui(m
∗2
t∗ [θ]; θ) >






It follows that, in all cases, these choices of m̂i strictly improve the expected payoff
of agent i if either Rule 2 or Rule 3 is triggered. This implies that mi is never a
best response to any belief λi, which contradicts our hypothesis that mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i .

Step 2: For any θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ F (θ), there exists m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ) such that g(m∗) = a.
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1 , 1, 1), where m
∗2







j , 1, 1), where m
∗2
j [θ] = aj−1(θ), which denotes one of the
maximizers of uj−1(·; θ) within all the outcomes in F (θ). Then, the constructed
message profile m∗ induces Rule 1 and agent 1 becomes the winner of the modulo
game. We thus have g(m∗) = a by construction. What remains to show is that
m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ).
By construction of the mechanism, Rule 3 cannot be triggered by any unilateral
deviation from Rule 1. So, the specification of m∗4i does not affect our argument.
Moreover, also by construction of the mechanism, no agent has an incentive to
induce Rule 2 with a unilateral deviation from a truthful profile under Rule 1. So,
effectively, the specification of m∗3i does not affect our argument either.
We first show that m∗1 can be made a best response to some belief. Define
λ∗1 ∈ ∆(M−1) as follows: for any m−1 ∈M−1, if λ∗1(m−1) > 0,
m1j = θ;
m2j [θ] = aj−1(θ);
m5j =
{
2 if j = 2,
1 otherwise;
m6j = 1.
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Given this belief λ∗1 and m∗1, agent 2 becomes the winner of
the modulo game so that the outcome a1(θ), which is the best one for agent 1, is
generated. Therefore, m∗1 is a best response to λ
∗
1 so that it survives the first round
of deletion of never best responses.







2, 2, 1) if j = 2,




j , 1, 1) otherwise.






2 if k = 1,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1.
for all k 6= 2. Then, given this belief λ̄2 and m̄2, agent 3 becomes the winner of
the modulo game so that the outcome a2(θ), which is the best one for agent 2, is
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realized. Therefore, m̄2 is a best response to λ̄2 so that it survives the first round
of deletion of never best responses. Assume j ∈ N\{1, 2}. Define λ̄j ∈ ∆(M−j) as








j + 1 if k = 1
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= j. Assume j < n. Then, given the belief λ̄j and m̄j, agent j + 1
becomes the winner of the modulo game so that the outcome aj(θ), which is the
best one for agent j, is realized. Assume, on the other hand, that j = n. Then,
given the belief λ̄j and m̄j, agent 1 becomes the winner of the modulo game so
that the outcome an(θ), which is the best one for agent n, is realized. Therefore,
m̄j is a best response to λ̄j so that it survives the first round of deletion of never
best responses. We can repeat this argument iteratively so that m∗1 survives the
iterative deletion of never best responses. Hence, m∗1 ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i .
Third, we shall show that, for each j 6= 1, m∗j can be made a best response to








j + 1 if k = 1,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= j. Given this belief λ∗j and m∗j , agent j + 1 becomes the winner of
the modulo game so that the outcome aj(θ), which is the best one for agent j, is
realized. Therefore, for each j 6= 1, m∗j is a best response to λ∗j so that it survives
the first round of deletion of never best responses.





1, j + 1, 1), where m̄
2
1[θ] = an(θ). Define λ̄1 ∈ ∆(M−1) as follows: for
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n+ 2− j if k = 2,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= 1. Given this belief λ̄1 and m̄1, agent 2 becomes the winner of the
modulo game so that the outcome a1(θ), which is the best one for agent 1, is
realized. Therefore, m̄1 is a best response to λ̄1 so that it survives the first round
of deletion of never best responses.
Consider agent k ∈ N\{1, j}. We first assume k < n. Define m̄k = (θ, m̄2k, m̄3k, m̄4k, 1, 1),
where m̄2k[θ] = ak−1(θ). Define λ̄k ∈ ∆(M−k) as follows: for any m−k ∈ M−k, if
λ̄k(m−k) > 0,
m1i = θ;
m2i [θ] = ai−1(θ);
m6i = 1,




i = n + k − 1. Given this belief λ̄k and m̄k, agent k + 1
becomes the winner of the modulo game so that the outcome ak(θ), which is the
best one for agent k, is realized. Therefore, m̄k is a best response to λ̄k so that it
survives the first round of deletion of never best responses.
Assume n 6= j. We define m̄n = (θ, m̄2n, m̄3n, m̄4n, 1, 1) and λ̄n ∈ ∆(M−n) as








for all i 6= n. Given this belief λ̄n and m̄n, agent 1 becomes the winner of the
modulo game so that the outcome an(θ), which is the best for agent n, is realized.
Therefore, m̄n is a best response to λ̄n so that it survives the first round of deletion
of never best responses.
We conclude that the support of λ∗j is rationalizable. So, we can repeat this
argument iteratively so that for each j 6= 1, m∗j survives the iterative deletion of
never best responses. Therefore, m∗j ∈ S
Γ(θ)
j for each j 6= 1. Since m∗1 ∈ S
Γ(θ)
1 , we
obtain m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ). This completes the proof of Step 2. 
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Step 3: mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i ⇒ λi(m−i) = 0 for any profile (mi,m−i) under Rules 2 or 3,
where λi ∈ ∆(M−i) represents the belief held by i to which mi is a best response.









i , 1) for some θ
′ ∈ Θ, where the state θ′ announced by different
agents might be different. Given the message mi, we define the set of messages of
the remaining agents which trigger Rule 1, 2, or 3. Let M1−i be the set of m−i ∈M−i
such that (mi,m−i) triggers Rule 1 and M
2,i
−i be the set of m−i ∈ M−i such that
(mi,m−i) triggers Rule 2 with agent i as the deviating player (odd man out).
We consider a given belief λi of agent i. If
∑
m−i∈M1−i
λi(m−i) = 0, then Rule 2
or 3 will be triggered with probability one. Although Rule 2 can now be triggered
with a “deviating agent (odd man out)” being different from i, it is easily checked
that a similar argument to that in Step 1 applies so that the message mi cannot












, 2]) if θ̃ = θ
′
m3i [θ̃] otherwise,




]; θ). Define m̂4i = arg maxy∈∆(A) ui(y; θ). We set










i ) as i’s




i unchanged. Then, as
m̂6i tends to infinity, agent i’s expected utility from choosing m̂i is approximately












which is strictly larger than i’s expected payoff from choosing mi. Hence, by
choosing m̂6i large enough, m̂i is a better response to λi (in words, the loss in Rule
2 can always be offset by a bigger gain in Rule 3). This is a contradiction.








i , 1) ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i , it follows that agent i must be




λi(m−i) = 1. 
We introduce an additional piece of notation. For any θ, θ













] = ×i∈NSΓ(θ)i [θ
′






Step 4: m ∈ SΓ(θ) ⇒ g(m) ∈ F (θ).
Proof of Step 4: By Step 3, we know that if mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i , there exists θ
′ ∈ Θ
such that agent i both is using and is convinced that every agent j is using only








j , 1). We begin with the following
auxiliary claim, whose proof is relegated to the appendix:
Claim 3 If there exists m̄ ∈ SΓ(θ)[θ′ ], for any a∗ ∈ F (θ′), there also exists m∗ ∈
SΓ(θ)[θ
′
] such that a∗ = g(m∗).
We thus proceed with the proof. If θ
′
= θ, by Rule 1 and the construction of
the mechanism, g(m) ∈ F (θ). So, in what follows, we assume that θ′ 6= θ. Suppose
by way of contradiction that there exists m̄ ∈ SΓ(θ)[θ′ ] such that g(m̄) /∈ F (θ).
Since g(m̄) ∈ F (θ′), by uniform monotonicity, we know that there exist i ∈ N ,
a∗ ∈ F (θ′), and z∗ ∈ ∆(A) such that ui(a∗; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z∗; θ
′
); and ui(a
∗; θ) < ui(z
∗; θ).









j , 1) ∈ S
Γ(θ)













j , 1) for any









all m̃i ∈Mi. Define
m̂−i(m
∗






Note that we have g(m∗i , m̂−i(m
∗
i )) ∈ arg maxa∈F (θ′ ) ui(a; θ), i.e., g(m∗i , m̂−i(m∗i ))
induces one of i’s best outcomes under Rule 1 in which all agents unanimously
announce θ
′
in state θ. Without loss of generality, assume that the winner of
the modulo game that gives this great outcome to agent i is actually not agent i
himself.10
Then, we define λ̃i ∈ ∆(M−i) as follows: λ̃i(m−i) = 0 if and only if m−i 6=
m̂−i(m
∗
i ). By construction of λ̃i, we have that m
∗
i must be a best response to
the redefined belief λ̃i. Since m
∗
i is a best response to λ̃i and m
∗
i triggers Rule
1 with probability one under λ̃i, agent i should not in particular have an incen-









i )); θ) for any m
′
i.
We can organize the argument in two cases:
10This is indeed confirmed in the proof of Claim 3, where we explicitly construct m∗i from m̄i.
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Case 1. Assume g(m∗i , m̂−i(m
∗
i )) = a
∗. Then, we define m̂3i as follows: for any
θ̃ ∈ Θ,
m̂3i [θ̃, 1] =
{
z∗ if θ̃ = θ
′
,
m∗3i [θ̃, 1] otherwise,
and
m̂3i [θ̃, 2] =
{
a∗ if θ̃ = θ
′
,
m∗3i [θ̃, 2] otherwise.










i ) where we only change the third and sixth




i . With this choice of strategy, agent i changes




By choosing m̂6i sufficiently large, we conclude that m̂i is an even better response
than m∗i to λ̃i. This contradicts the hypothesis that m
∗
i is a best response to λ̃i.




]. By Claim 3, this further implies
that m̄i /∈ SΓ(θ)i [θ
′
]. This contradicts our hypothesis that m̄ ∈ SΓ(θ)[θ′ ].
Case 2. Assume, on the other hand, that g(m∗i , m̂−i(m
∗
i )) 6= a∗. We shall show
that this case is impossible. In this case, relying on the strategy m̂i as defined in
Case 1, note that g(m̂i, m̂−i(m
∗









as the only change happened upon a∗ being the outcome.
For each ε > 0 and m−i, we define
λεi (m−i) =
{
1− ε if m−i = m̂−i(m∗i )




, m̃2−i = a







where we denote m̃1j = θ
′
for all j 6= i by m̃1−i = θ
′





−i. Since agent i, by our hypothesis, is not the winner of the
modulo game under (m∗i , m̂−i(m
∗
i )), by construction of m̃−i, we have g(m
∗
i , m̃−i) =
a∗. Moreover, each m̃j is rationalizable because agent j can believe that agent i
chooses j’s best outcome in the place of m2i [θ
′
] and i becomes the winner of the
modulo game.
Consider again the strategy m̂i as in Case 1. As m̂
6
i tends to infinity, we obtain∑
m−i
λεi (m−i)ui(g(m̂i,m−i); θ)
≈ (1− ε)ui(g(m∗i , m̂−i(m∗i )); θ) + εui(z∗; θ)







where the last equality follows from the fact that agent i is not the winner of the
modulo game when the others are using the specified strategy with probability ε.
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i . We conclude that m
∗
i
is not a best response to λεi for any ε > 0.
Finally, to show impossibility, we claim that m∗i is a best response to λ
ε
i as long
as we choose ε > 0 sufficiently small. Consider an alternative message m
′
i that
induces Rule 2. Fix any such alternative message m
′
i. No matter how large m
′6
i


















i, m̃−i); θ)− ui(g(m∗i , m̃−i); θ)
]
.
Indeed, this is so because g(m∗i , m̃−i) = a





); θ) by SNWA. Moreover, given agent i’s belief λεi , m
∗
i results in the best





Therefore, once we choose ε > 0 small enough, m∗i is made an even better response
to λεi than m
′
i. Since this argument applies to any such alternative message m
′
i,
agent i has no incentive to trigger Rule 2 himself. This establishes that m∗i is a
best response to λεi . 
Steps 1 through 4 together imply that for each θ ∈ Θ,⋃
m∈SΓ(θ)
{g(m)} = F (θ).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
We make some comments on the properties of the mechanism we constructed.
One novelty of the mechanism lies in the way we use the modulo game under the
consensus Rule 1. Modulo games have been often used in the literature, but they
are viewed as a substitute for the integer games where the person who announces
the highest integer becomes a dictator. In fact, our Rule 3 on strong disagreements
is a stochastic version of an integer game, used to knock out bad message profiles
so that the agents end up making a unanimous announcement in equilibrium, as
only Rule 1 (consensus) prevails. However, in our mechanism, the modulo game
in Rule 1 is used to select an outcome rather than knock out bad message profiles.
Since the rational expectations hypothesis is not needed here, each agent believes
that the modulo game under Rule 1 always works in his favor but the resulting
outcome is not necessarily what he expects to happen.
Our paper follows the classic implementation literature in allowing for arbitrary
mechanisms. This is often justified in order to obtain a tight characterization, i.e.,
to have a small gap between necessary and sufficient conditions. Jackson (1992),
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however, rightly argues that some of the power of implementation results derive
from the fact that we have not imposed any restrictions on the mechanisms. In or-
der to restrict attention to reasonable mechanisms, Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava
(henceforth, JPS, 1994) propose the best response property, which requires that
there be a best response for every possible belief that an agent might hold about
other agents’ strategies. Indeed, our mechanism does not satisfy this property as
there exist no best responses when Rule 3 (strong disagreements) is triggered. As
we discuss in Section 5, finite mechanisms sometimes suffice for rationalizable im-
plementation. Finite mechanisms clearly satisfy the JPS best response property.
We will have more to say about rationalizable implementation by finite mecha-
nisms for the case of SCFs and postpone this discussion until we state our result
for that case.
When focusing only on SCFs, we obtain the following result as a corollary of
Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3). If an SCF f
satisfies Maskin monotonicity and NWA, it is fully implementable in rationalizable
strategies.
Remark: BMT (2011) show in their Proposition 1 that strict Maskin monotonic-
ity is necessary for rationalizable implementation of SCFs and further show in their
footnote 5 that under NWA, strict Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to the stan-
dard Maskin monotonicity. Therefore, our result is consistent with BMT in the
case of SCFs.
Proof : This follows because uniform monotonicity and SNWA reduce to Maskin
monotonicity and NWA (the SCF-version used by BMT (2011)), respectively, as
long as the social choice rule is single-valued. 
This is a logical strengthening of Proposition 2 of BMT (2011) because we
completely dispense with the responsiveness of SCFs, which is assumed there. We
say that an SCF f is responsive if, for any θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, whenever θ 6= θ′ , f(θ) 6= f(θ′).
We recall that BMT (2011) introduce their best-response property, and restrict
attention to the mechanisms satisfying it when considering nonresponsive SCFs.
It is easy to see that our canonical mechanism used in Theorem 2 satisfies the BMT
best-response property; see Definition 6 of BMT (p.1267). 11
11In their proposition 3, BMT show that strict Maskin monotonicity∗ (BMT (p.1265)) is a nec-
essary condition for rationalizable implementation of SCFs by a mechanism satisfying their best
response property. Maskin monotonicity∗, together with the modified version of NWA, implies
strict Maskin monotonicity∗, which is itself logically stronger than strict Maskin monotonicity.
See p.1269 of BMT for the details. When considering environments with monetary transfers and
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7 Concluding Remarks
By relying on a setwise condition requiring the nestedness of lower contour sets,
a condition that we term uniform monotonicity, we have shown that rationaliz-
able implementation of correspondences leads to a significantly more permissive
theory than its counterpart using Nash equilibrium. This has been established for
environments with at least three agents. The two-agent general sufficiency argu-
ment is likely handled by adding the usual requirement of nonempty intersections
of lower contour sets; we chose instead to focus on a simple finite mechanism for
a useful example. The extension to incomplete information environments should
be our natural next step. Our conclusion is that, in the comparison with Nash
equilibrium, dropping the rational expectations assumption while still retaining
best-replies to beliefs, expands significantly the range of socially desirable rules
that can be potentially decentralized. For a specific rule in a concrete environ-
ment, one should aim to construct a less abstract mechanism than our proposed
canonical one, but we view our contribution as a way to draw the landscape of
rules that could be in principle implemented.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we first provide the proof of Claim 3, which is part of Step 4 in
the proof of Theorem 2. Second, we discuss ordinality issues. Third, we comment
on the role of finite mechanisms, and fourth, we outline how one can extend our
results (Theorems 1 and 2) to the case of weak implementation.
A.1. Proof of Claim 3
We set n + 1 ≡ 1 and 0 ≡ n. We construct a message profile m∗, which
induces Rule 1 with probability one, and in which all agents unanimously an-
nounce θ
′
in the first component of their message, and agent i + 1 becomes the
winner of the modulo game, as follows. First, for agent i + 1, define m∗i+1 =
quasilinear preferences, Chen, Kunimoto, Sun, and Xiong (2017) show that an SCF is rationaliz-
ably implementable by a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗. That
paper also obtains the following result: an SCF is Nash implementable by a finite mechanism if
and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Hence, in some classes of economic environments,
when we only deal with SCFs and finite mechanisms, Nash implementation yields results that
are more permissive than rationalizable implementation. For the case of SCCs, the result for
Nash implementation is extended. In particular, if an SCC is deterministic and the set of pure
outcomes is finite, the SCC is Nash implementable by a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies
Maskin monotonicity. What is unknown is whether the rationalizable implementation result can












] = a∗. Second, for each j ∈ N\{i+1},













) if j 6= 1
an(θ, θ
′
) if j = 1,
where aj−1(θ, θ
′
) ∈ arg maxa∈F (θ′ ) uj−1(a; θ), which denotes one of the maximizers
of uj−1(·; θ) within all the outcomes in F (θ
′
). What remains to show is that
m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ). We proceed to do so.
First, we show that m∗i+1 is a best response to some belief. Define λ
∗
i+1 ∈











2 if j = i+ 2,
1 otherwise;
m6j = 1,
for all j ∈ N\{i + 1}. Given λ∗i+1 and m∗i+1, agent (i + 2) becomes the winner of
the modulo game. Thus, it generates the best possible outcome for agent (i + 1)
conditional on Rule 1. Since there exists m̄i+1 ∈ SΓ(θ)i+1 [θ
′
] andm∗i+1 differs from m̄i+1
only in the second and fifth components of the message, m∗i+1 is a best response to
λ∗i+1.





that each mj in the support of λ
∗
i+1 is rationalizable. Define λ
∗
i+2 ∈ ∆(M−(i+2))











i+ 3 if k = i+ 1,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= i + 2. Then, given λ∗i+2 and m∗i+2, agent (i + 3) becomes the winner of
the modulo game so that the best outcome for agent (i + 2) conditional on Rule


















j + 1 if k = i+ 1,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= j. Assume j < n. Then, given λ∗j and m∗j , agent j + 1 becomes
the winner of the modulo game so that the best outcome for agent j is realized
conditional on Rule 1. Assume, on the other hand, that j = n. Then, given λ∗n
and m∗n, agent 1 becomes the winner of the modulo game so that the best outcome
for agent n is realized conditional on Rule 1. We know that (i) by our hypothesis
and Step 3, there exist m̄j ∈ SΓ(θ)j [θ
′
] together with the belief λ̄j to which m̄j is a
best response and which induces Rule 1 with probability one; (ii) m∗j differs from
m̄j only in the second and fifth components of the message; and (iii) m
∗
j generates
the best outcome for himself conditional on Rule 1 given the belief λ∗j . Therefore,
we have that the support of λ∗i+1 is rationalizable. That is, for each j 6= i + 1,




]. Thus, m∗i+1 ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i+1 .
Third, we show that, for each j 6= i + 1, m∗j can be made a best response to
















j + 1 if k = i+ 1,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= j. Given λ∗j and m∗j , agent j + 1 becomes the winner of the modulo
game so that the best outcome for agent j conditional on Rule 1 is realized. Since
we know that there exists m̄j ∈ SΓ(θ)j [θ
′
] together with λ̄j to which m̄i is a best
response and which induces Rule 1 with probability one and m∗j differs from m̄j
only in the second and fifth components of the message, m∗j is a best response to
λ∗j .
Fourth, we claim that for each j 6= i+1, the support of λ∗j is rationalizable, i.e.,










i+1, j+1, 1), as




] = an(θ, θ
′
) if i+ 1 = 1 (i.e.,
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i = n) or ai(θ, θ
′
















n+ 2− j if k = i+ 2,
1 otherwise;
m6k = 1,
for all k 6= i + 1. Given m̂i+1 and λ̂i+1, agent (i + 2) becomes the winner of
the modulo game so that the best outcome for agent (i + 1) conditional on Rule






k, 1, 1), as a




] = an(θ, θ
′
) if k = 1 or ak−1(θ, θ
′
)
















k + 1 if h = i+ 1,
1 otherwise;
m6h = 1,
for all h 6= k. Given m̂k and λ̂k, agent (k + 1) becomes the winner of the modulo
game so that the best outcome for agent k conditional on Rule 1 is realized. We
know that: (i) by our hypothesis and Step 3, there exists m̄k ∈ SΓ(θ)k [θ
′
] together
with the belief λ̄k to which m̄k is a best response and which induces Rule 1 with
probability one; (ii) m̂k differs from m̄k only in the second and fifth components
of the message; and (iii) m̂k generates the best outcome for himself conditional on
Rule 1 given the belief λ̂k. Therefore, for each j 6= i+ 1, we have that the support









] for each j 6= i+ 1.
In sum, we conclude that we have m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ) such that g(m∗) = a∗, as desired.

A.2. Ordinality
The theory of implementation often associates each state with a profile of ordi-
nal preferences and does not introduce any cardinal representation. In this subsec-
tion, we identify a state θ with a profile of ordinal preferences (θi )i∈N over A. This
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is the ordinal approach considered in Mezzetti and Renou (2012) in the context of
Nash implementation. BMT (2011) also discuss the ordinal approach to rational-
izable implementation. Specifically, we refer the reader to Section 6 of Mezzetti
and Renou (2012) and Section 5 of BMT (2011). We say that u = (u1, . . . , un) is a
cardinal representation of (θi )i∈N,θ∈Θ if, for each a, a
′ ∈ A, i ∈ N , and θ ∈ Θ, we
have ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(a
′
; θ) ⇔ a θi a
′
. A deterministic SCC F is ordinally fully im-
plementable in rationalizable strategies if it is fully implementable in rationalizable
strategies “independently of the cardinal representation.”
We come to the next couple of definitions:
Definition 6 A deterministic SCC F satisfies ordinal (weak) uniform mono-
tonicity if it satisfies (weak) uniform monotonicity for any cardinal representation.
With its weak version, we can show the following necessity result, whose proof
is omitted:
Proposition 1 If a deterministic SCC F is ordinally fully implementable in ra-
tionalizable strategies, it satisfies ordinal weak uniform monotonicity.
Here is our next definition:
Definition 7 A deterministic SCC F satisfies ordinal SNWA if, for each θ ∈ Θ
and i ∈ N , there exists a pure alternative zθi ∈ A such that a θi zθi for each
a ∈ F (θ).
The proof of this sufficiency result is also omitted:
Proposition 2 Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3). If a deter-
ministic SCC F satisfies ordinal uniform monotonicity and ordinal SNWA, it is
ordinally fully implementable in rationalizable strategies.
A.3. Finite Mechanisms
Recall that our sufficiency result for rationalizable implementation (Theorem
2) employs an infinite implementing mechanism. In this section, we elaborate on
the role of finite implementing mechanisms. We show by example that there is a
finite mechanism that achieves Nash implementation but fails rationalizable im-
plementation. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that one cannot achieve
rationalizable implementation by a finite mechanism. Rather, the point is that a
Nash-implementing finite mechanism need not achieve rationalizable implementa-
tion.
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There are two agents N = {1, 2}; two states Θ = {α, β}; and a finite number
of pure outcomes A = {a1, a2, a3}. Agent 1’s strict preference relation over A is
given as follows:





Agent 2’s strict preference relation over A is given as follows:





Note that Agent 2 has state-independent preferences. We consider the following
SCC: F (α) = {a1, a3} and F (β) = {a3}. We first claim that the SCC F satisfies
Maskin monotonicity. When we move from β to α, we know that F (β) ⊆ F (α).
So, we consider the case of moving from α to β. Fix a1 ∈ F (α). Since there is a
preference reversal around a1 such that a1 α1 a2 and a2 
β
1 a1, going from α to β
is not a monotonic transformation of preferences around a1. Thus, no conditions
are imposed on F so that it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. This further implies
that F satisfies uniform monotonicity as well.
We construct a finite mechanism that implements the SCC F in Nash equilib-
rium. Consider the following mechanism Γ = (M, g) where M1 = {m11,m21,m31};







Agent 1 m21 a2 a3
m31 a3 a3










2) are pure strategy






2) are pure strategy
Nash equilibria in the game Γ(β). As long as we are concerned with pure strategy
Nash equilibria, we can see that the mechanism Γ Nash implements the SCC F .
Suppose that there is a nontrivial mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the game
Γ(α). Assume that agent 2 chooses a pure strategy in the supposed mixed equi-
librium. Then, agent 1 has an incentive to randomize over the messages only if
agent 2 chooses m22 where a3 is the resulting outcome no matter what agent 1
does. Therefore, any such mixed strategy equilibrium outcome, if it exists, is con-
sistent with the SCC. Now, let us consider a mixed strategy equilibrium where
agent 2 uses a genuinely mixed strategy: choose m12 with probability q and m
2
2
with probability 1 − q where q ∈ (0, 1). In the game Γ(α), for any q ∈ (0, 1), m21
cannot be a best response to agent 2’s strategy (q, 1− q). Hence, in such a mixed
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strategy equilibrium, m21 is never played with positive probability. Then, any such
mixed strategy equilibrium outcome, if it exists, only generates a1 or a3, which are
consistent with the SCC F .
Suppose that there is a nontrivial mixed strategy equilibrium in the game Γ(β).
Assume that agent 2 chooses a pure strategy in the supposed mixed equilibrium.
Then, agent 1 has an incentive to randomize over the messages only if agent 2
chooses m22 where a3 is the resulting outcome no matter what agent 1 does. There-
fore, any such mixed strategy equilibrium outcome, if it exists, is consistent with
the SCC. Now, let us consider a mixed strategy equilibrium where agent 2 uses a
genuinely mixed strategy: choose m12 with probability q and m
2
2 with probability
1− q where q ∈ (0, 1). In the game Γ(β), for any q ∈ (0, 1), only m21 is a strict best
response to agent 2’s strategy (q, 1− q). In other words, agent 2 should choose m21
with probability one. However, if agent 1 chooses m21 for sure, agent 2 is better off
by switching to choosing a pure strategy m22. Therefore, there is no such mixed
strategy equilibrium. This implies that the SCC F is Nash implementable by the
finite mechanism Γ even in the sense of Mezzetti and Renou (2012), who require
every outcome in the support of Nash equilibria to be consistent with the SCC.
Next, we show that the mechanism Γ does not implement the SCC F in ra-
tionalizable strategies. Consider the game Γ(β). First, m21 is a best response to
the belief that agent 2 chooses m12. Second, m
1
2 is a best response to the belief
that agent 1 chooses m11. Third, m
1
1 is a best response to the belief that agent 2




2 survive the first round of deletion of never







Since both m21 and m
1





which is inconsistent with F (β) = {a3}. Therefore, the SCC F is not rationalizably
implementable by the mechanism Γ.
We can easily modify this example by adding to A one more pure outcome a4,
which is a strictly worse outcome for anyone than {a1, a2, a3} in any state. With
this modification, the SCC F now satisfies SNWA. It is possible that the SCC in
this example is implementable in rationalizable strategies. In particular, note that
the only assumption missing from our Theorem 2 is the presence of two agents.
Adding a third agent, say with state-independent preferences identical to agent
2, but with only one message in the mechanism, would still allow us to retain all
the features of the example. In that modification, Theorem 2 would implement
F using the infinite mechanism in its proof. We do not know whether one could
prove Theorem 2 on the basis of a finite canonical mechanism. On the other hand,
the example in Section 5 is also based on a finite mechanism, and it re-enforces
the paper’s main message of rationalizable implementation being significantly more
permissive than Nash implementation, even for a two-agent environment.
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In closing, we recall that BMT (2011) introduce the best-response property, and
restrict attention to the mechanisms satisfying it when considering nonresponsive
SCFs. It is easy to see that our canonical mechanism used in Theorem 2 satisfies
the best-response property. Of course, as long as we have a finite mechanism that
achieves rationalizable implementation, that finite mechanism will satisfy it as well.
This is confirmed in the example we discussed in Section 5.
A.4. Weak Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies
Next, we provide the definition of weak rationalizable implementation.
Definition 8 (Weak Rationalizable Implementation) An SCC F is weakly
implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ =
(M, g) such that for each θ ∈ Θ, the following two conditions hold: (1) SΓ(θ) 6= ∅;
and (2) for each m ∈ SΓ(θ), then g(m) ∈ F (θ).
We begin by proposing a condition for weak implementation in rationalizable
strategies:
Definition 9 An SCC F satisfies weak K-uniform monotonicity if, for every
pair of states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, there exists a nonempty set K(θ) ⊆ F (θ) such that if
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ co(K(θ)), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A),
then, K(θ) ⊆ F (θ′).
Remark: When we consider SCFs, co(K(θ)) becomes a singleton set. Therefore,
in this case, the condition just defined also reduces to Maskin monotonicity.
We slightly strengthen weak K-uniform monotonicity into the following:
Definition 10 An SCC F satisfies K-uniform monotonicity if, for every pair
of states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, there exists a nonempty set K(θ) ⊆ F (θ) such that, if
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ K(θ), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A),
then, K(θ) ⊆ F (θ′).
The same comment we made after the definition of uniform monotonicity ap-
plies here. Therefore, under expected utility, weak K-uniform monotonicity is
equivalent to K-uniform monotonicity. Note also that K-uniform monotonicity
is logically weaker than uniform monotonicity, itself weaker than Maskin mono-
tonicity. All three reduce to the same condition when one considers single-valued
rules.
The necessity result for weak implementation follows:
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Theorem 3 If an SCC F is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies, it
satisfies weak K-uniform monotonicity.
Proof : Suppose F is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies by a
mechanism Γ = (M, g). Fix two states θ, θ





Assume the following property:
ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(z; θ)⇒ ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(z; θ
′
) ∀a ∈ co(K(θ)), ∀i ∈ N, ∀z ∈ ∆(A) (∗)
Then, due to the hypothesis that F is weakly implementable by Γ, we fix m∗ ∈
SΓ(θ), and we have that g(m∗) ∈ K(θ).
Fix i ∈ N . Since m∗i ∈ S
Γ(θ)
i , there exists λ
m∗i ,θ
i ∈ ∆(M−i) satisfying the fol-
lowing two properties: (i) λ
m∗i ,θ























We focus on the best response property of m∗i summarized by inequality (ii).
Fix m
′
i ∈Mi. Due to the construction of λ
m∗i ,θ














ui(a; θ) ≥ ui(za; θ),

















Since g(m∗i ,m−i) ∈ K(θ) for each m−i with λ
m∗i ,θ
i (m−i) > 0, we have a ∈
co(K(θ)). Using Property (∗), we also obtain
ui(a; θ
′
) ≥ ui(za; θ
′
).
Due to the choice of a and za and the hypothesis that ui(·) is a von-Neumann-


















Since this argument does not depend upon the choice of m
′
i, this shows that m
∗
i
is a best response to λ
m∗i ,θ
i in state θ
′




i . Since the
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choice of agent i is arbitrary, we can conclude that m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ
′
). Furthermore, since
the choice of m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ) is also arbitrary, we have SΓ(θ) ⊆ SΓ(θ
′
). Finally, by weak









{g(m)} ⊆ F (θ′).
The proof is thus complete. 
Next, we state the general sufficiency result for weak implementation in ratio-
nalizable strategies.
Theorem 4 Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3) and the set of pure
outcomes A is finite. If a deterministic SCC F satisfies K-uniform monotonicity
and SNWA, it is weakly implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Remark: In the sufficiency result below, we need the compactness of K(θ). To
guarantee this, we assume A is finite and only consider deterministic SCCs. We
view this as a technical requirement for the result.
Proof : By K-uniform monotonicity, for each θ ∈ Θ, we have a nonempty
set K(θ) ⊆ F (θ). Since the SCC F is deterministic and the set of pure out-
comes A is finite, we have that K(θ) is a finite set for each θ ∈ Θ. We con-











i ) where m
1
i ∈ Θ,m2i = {m2i [θ]}θ∈Θ where m2i [θ] ∈ K(θ),
m3i = {(m3i [θ, 1],m3i [θ, 2])}θ∈Θ where m3i [θ, 1] ∈ ∆(A) and m3i [θ, 2] ∈ K(θ), m4i ∈
∆(A),m5i ∈ N , and m6i ∈ N. This mechanism is essentially the same as the one
proposed in the proof of Theorem 2. The only change we have made from the mes-
sage space proposed in the proof of Theorem 2 is that we use K(θ) in the spaces
of m2i [θ] and m
3
i [θ, 2]. The outcome function g : M → ∆(A) is defined exactly as
for the case of full implementation in the proof of Theorem 2. The proof consists
of Steps I through IV, parallel to the steps for the full implementation proof.
Step I: mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i ⇒ m6i = 1.
Step II: For any θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ K(θ), there exists m∗ ∈ SΓ(θ) such that g(m∗) = a.
Step III: mi ∈ SΓ(θ)i ⇒ λi(m−i) = 0 for any profile (mi,m−i) under Rules 2 or
3, where λi ∈ ∆(M−i) represents the belief held by agent i to which mi is a best
response.
Step IV: m ∈ SΓ(θ) ⇒ g(m) ∈ F (θ).
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Steps I through IV together imply that for each θ ∈ Θ and m ∈M : (i) SΓ(θ) 6= ∅
and (ii) m ∈ SΓ(θ) ⇒ g(m) ∈ F (θ). Thus, this completes the proof of Theorem 4.

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